HOMEMODULESMODULE_09

The Courts

Unelected Power

5 hours4 topicsPrimary sources included
9.1

Judicial Review: The Power Not in the Constitution

How the courts gave themselves the authority to strike down laws

Nowhere does the Constitution explicitly grant courts the power to declare laws unconstitutional. This power - judicial review - was established by the Supreme Court itself in Marbury v. Madison (1803), and has made the Court the ultimate arbiter of American law.

judicial_review.pseudo
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CLASS SupremeCourt:
  
  FUNCTION marbury_v_madison(1803):
    // Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning:
    
    premise_1 = "The Constitution is supreme law"
    premise_2 = "Laws contrary to Constitution are void"
    premise_3 = "Courts must decide cases under law"
    
    conclusion = "Courts must decide if laws 
                  violate Constitution"
    
    // This power is claimed, not granted
    self.power = "JUDICIAL_REVIEW"
    
  FUNCTION review_law(law):
    // Court decides if law violates Constitution
    // No appeal possible - they have final word
    
    IF this.majority_finds_unconstitutional(law):
      law.status = "VOID"
      // Congress cannot override
      // President cannot override
      // Only options:
      //   1. Constitutional amendment (2/3 + 3/4)
      //   2. Wait for Court to change its mind
      //   3. Change Court composition
      
// Current impact:
// - 9 unelected, lifetime-appointed judges
// - Final authority on constitutional meaning
// - Can overturn precedent at will (see: Dobbs 2022)
The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
Legal scholars call this the "counter-majoritarian difficulty": how can unelected judges overriding elected legislatures be justified in a democracy? The Court's legitimacy depends on public acceptance, but the public has no direct control.
9.2

Lifetime Appointments and Strategic Retirement

How the confirmation process became a political battleground

Federal judges serve "during good Behaviour" - effectively for life. Combined with the stakes of judicial review, this has transformed Supreme Court nominations into existential political conflicts where justices time retirements for partisan advantage.

appointment_politics.pseudo
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CLASS JudicialAppointment:
  
  constitutional_process = {
    nomination: "President nominates",
    confirmation: "Senate advises and consents",
    term: "Lifetime ('during good Behaviour')"
  }
  
  // What the Founders likely expected:
  expected_dynamics = {
    nominations: "Qualified jurists",
    confirmation: "Relatively routine",
    term_length: "~10-15 years (shorter lifespans)"
  }
  
  // Modern reality:
  actual_dynamics = {
    nominations: "Ideologically vetted by party groups",
    confirmation: "Partisan warfare",
    term_length: "30-40+ years (longer lifespans)",
    strategic_retirement: "Time exit for allied president"
  }

FUNCTION strategic_retirement(justice):
  // Justices choose when to leave
  current_president = get_president()
  
  IF justice.ideology ALIGNS_WITH current_president:
    IF justice.age > 70 OR justice.health DECLINING:
      CONSIDER retirement  // Lock in successor
  ELSE:
    // Hold seat as long as possible
    // Wait for aligned president
    // Even if it means dying on bench

// Examples:
// - RBG (D) died under Trump, replaced by Barrett (R)
// - Kennedy (swing) retired under Trump, replaced by Kavanaugh (R)
// - Breyer (D) retired under Biden, replaced by Jackson (D)
18.5 yrs
Average current tenure on Supreme Court
83
Average age at death/retirement (historical)
9
Seats contested like elections
9.3

The Shadow Docket

How emergency orders reshape law without full briefing

Traditionally, the Supreme Court decided cases after full briefing, oral argument, and published opinions. Increasingly, the Court makes consequential decisions through emergency orders - the "shadow docket" - with minimal explanation or transparency.

shadow_docket.pseudo
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CLASS ShadowDocket:
  // Emergency applications and stays
  
  traditional_process = {
    briefing: "Months of written arguments",
    oral_argument: "Public hearing",
    opinion: "Full written reasoning",
    timeline: "9-12 months typical"
  }
  
  shadow_docket = {
    briefing: "Days or hours",
    oral_argument: "Usually none",
    opinion: "Often just 'GRANTED' or 'DENIED'",
    timeline: "Days, sometimes hours"
  }
  
  FUNCTION process_emergency(application):
    // Single justice can grant temporary relief
    // Full court can make permanent
    
    // But increasingly used for:
    major_policy_decisions = [
      "Block federal eviction moratorium (2021)",
      "Allow Texas abortion ban to take effect (2021)",
      "Block vaccine mandates (2022)",
      "Reinstate 'Remain in Mexico' policy (2021)"
    ]
    
    // Problem: No explanation of reasoning
    // No chance for amicus briefs
    // No public oral argument
    // Inconsistent with own precedents

STATISTICS:
  shadow_orders_1970s = ~5 per year
  shadow_orders_2020s = ~60+ per year
  // 12x increase in unexplained major decisions
The Texas Abortion Gambit
In 2021, Texas designed SB8 to evade judicial review by deputizing private citizens rather than state officials to enforce an abortion ban. The Supreme Court let it take effect via shadow docket, allowing an unconstitutional law (under then-precedent) to operate for months before Dobbs overturned Roe entirely.
9.4

Lower Courts: The Hidden Judiciary

Why the 870+ federal judges below SCOTUS matter more than you think

The Supreme Court only hears ~70 cases per year from thousands of petitions. For most litigants, the federal appeals courts are the final word. Control of these lower courts shapes law even without Supreme Court involvement.

federal_judiciary_structure.pseudo
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CLASS FederalJudiciary:
  
  structure = {
    district_courts: {
      count: 94,
      judges: ~670,
      role: "Trial courts, find facts"
    },
    circuit_courts: {
      count: 13,
      judges: ~180,
      role: "Appeals, set circuit precedent"
    },
    supreme_court: {
      count: 1,
      judges: 9,
      role: "Final appellate, constitutional questions"
    }
  }
  
FUNCTION case_path(lawsuit):
  // Most cases end at district court
  // ~55,000 district court appeals per year
  
  circuit_decision = appeals_court.hear(appeal)
  // Most cases end here - SCOTUS denies ~99% of petitions
  
  IF supreme_court.grants_cert(petition):  // ~70 per year
    RETURN supreme_court.decide()
  ELSE:
    RETURN circuit_decision  // This IS final law
    
// Strategic implication:
// "Forum shopping" - file in favorable circuit
// Circuit splits create different law in different regions

TRUMP_JUDICIARY_EFFECT:
  judges_appointed = 234  // in 4 years
  circuit_judges = 54  // flipped multiple circuits
  percentage_of_judiciary = ~27%
  // Many will serve 30+ years
1789

Judiciary Act

Creates initial 6-justice Supreme Court and 13 district courts

1869

Circuit Court of Appeals Act

Establishes modern three-tier structure; Supreme Court set at 9 justices

2016

Garland Blocked

Senate refuses hearings for 293 days; seat filled by Trump nominee

2017-2020

Court Transformation

234 federal judges confirmed, including 3 Supreme Court justices

9.5

Court Reform Debates

Proposals to fix the judiciary - and why they face massive obstacles

Growing concerns about judicial legitimacy have sparked reform proposals ranging from term limits to court expansion. Each faces significant constitutional and political barriers.

reform_proposals.pseudo
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CLASS CourtReformProposals:
  
  OPTION term_limits:
    proposal = "18-year terms, staggered (2 per presidential term)"
    benefits = [
      "Predictable vacancies",
      "Reduced stakes per appointment",
      "End strategic retirement"
    ]
    obstacles = {
      constitutional: "May require amendment 
                      ('during good Behaviour')",
      workaround: "Rotate to lower courts after 18 years",
      political: "Party in power always opposes"
    }
    
  OPTION court_expansion:
    proposal = "Add justices (9 → 13, 15, etc.)"
    benefits = [
      "Clearly constitutional (Congress sets size)",
      "Could rebalance partisan tilt",
      "Historical precedent (changed 7 times)"
    ]
    obstacles = {
      legitimacy: "Seen as 'court packing'",
      escalation: "Other party would expand too",
      filibuster: "Requires 60 votes or rule change"
    }
    
  OPTION jurisdiction_stripping:
    proposal = "Remove SCOTUS jurisdiction over certain issues"
    benefits = [
      "Congress has power under Article III",
      "Simple majority (maybe)"
    ]
    obstacles = {
      constitutional: "Unclear if full stripping allowed",
      court_review: "SCOTUS would review the stripping itself",
      precedent: "Rarely used successfully"
    }
    
  OPTION ethics_code:
    proposal = "Binding code of conduct for justices"
    status = "2023: First code adopted (but self-enforced)"
    problem = "No enforcement mechanism"

The Reform Paradox

Most court reforms would need to survive review by the very court being reformed. The Court could strike down term limits, jurisdiction stripping, or even aspects of expansion. The institution that most needs reform is also the institution that gets to decide if reforms are constitutional.

9
Justices - same number since 1869
7
Times Congress has changed Court size
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