Judicial Review: The Power Not in the Constitution
How the courts gave themselves the authority to strike down laws
Nowhere does the Constitution explicitly grant courts the power to declare laws unconstitutional. This power - judicial review - was established by the Supreme Court itself in Marbury v. Madison (1803), and has made the Court the ultimate arbiter of American law.
CLASS SupremeCourt:
FUNCTION marbury_v_madison(1803):
// Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning:
premise_1 = "The Constitution is supreme law"
premise_2 = "Laws contrary to Constitution are void"
premise_3 = "Courts must decide cases under law"
conclusion = "Courts must decide if laws
violate Constitution"
// This power is claimed, not granted
self.power = "JUDICIAL_REVIEW"
FUNCTION review_law(law):
// Court decides if law violates Constitution
// No appeal possible - they have final word
IF this.majority_finds_unconstitutional(law):
law.status = "VOID"
// Congress cannot override
// President cannot override
// Only options:
// 1. Constitutional amendment (2/3 + 3/4)
// 2. Wait for Court to change its mind
// 3. Change Court composition
// Current impact:
// - 9 unelected, lifetime-appointed judges
// - Final authority on constitutional meaning
// - Can overturn precedent at will (see: Dobbs 2022)Lifetime Appointments and Strategic Retirement
How the confirmation process became a political battleground
Federal judges serve "during good Behaviour" - effectively for life. Combined with the stakes of judicial review, this has transformed Supreme Court nominations into existential political conflicts where justices time retirements for partisan advantage.
CLASS JudicialAppointment:
constitutional_process = {
nomination: "President nominates",
confirmation: "Senate advises and consents",
term: "Lifetime ('during good Behaviour')"
}
// What the Founders likely expected:
expected_dynamics = {
nominations: "Qualified jurists",
confirmation: "Relatively routine",
term_length: "~10-15 years (shorter lifespans)"
}
// Modern reality:
actual_dynamics = {
nominations: "Ideologically vetted by party groups",
confirmation: "Partisan warfare",
term_length: "30-40+ years (longer lifespans)",
strategic_retirement: "Time exit for allied president"
}
FUNCTION strategic_retirement(justice):
// Justices choose when to leave
current_president = get_president()
IF justice.ideology ALIGNS_WITH current_president:
IF justice.age > 70 OR justice.health DECLINING:
CONSIDER retirement // Lock in successor
ELSE:
// Hold seat as long as possible
// Wait for aligned president
// Even if it means dying on bench
// Examples:
// - RBG (D) died under Trump, replaced by Barrett (R)
// - Kennedy (swing) retired under Trump, replaced by Kavanaugh (R)
// - Breyer (D) retired under Biden, replaced by Jackson (D)The Shadow Docket
How emergency orders reshape law without full briefing
Traditionally, the Supreme Court decided cases after full briefing, oral argument, and published opinions. Increasingly, the Court makes consequential decisions through emergency orders - the "shadow docket" - with minimal explanation or transparency.
CLASS ShadowDocket:
// Emergency applications and stays
traditional_process = {
briefing: "Months of written arguments",
oral_argument: "Public hearing",
opinion: "Full written reasoning",
timeline: "9-12 months typical"
}
shadow_docket = {
briefing: "Days or hours",
oral_argument: "Usually none",
opinion: "Often just 'GRANTED' or 'DENIED'",
timeline: "Days, sometimes hours"
}
FUNCTION process_emergency(application):
// Single justice can grant temporary relief
// Full court can make permanent
// But increasingly used for:
major_policy_decisions = [
"Block federal eviction moratorium (2021)",
"Allow Texas abortion ban to take effect (2021)",
"Block vaccine mandates (2022)",
"Reinstate 'Remain in Mexico' policy (2021)"
]
// Problem: No explanation of reasoning
// No chance for amicus briefs
// No public oral argument
// Inconsistent with own precedents
STATISTICS:
shadow_orders_1970s = ~5 per year
shadow_orders_2020s = ~60+ per year
// 12x increase in unexplained major decisionsLower Courts: The Hidden Judiciary
Why the 870+ federal judges below SCOTUS matter more than you think
The Supreme Court only hears ~70 cases per year from thousands of petitions. For most litigants, the federal appeals courts are the final word. Control of these lower courts shapes law even without Supreme Court involvement.
CLASS FederalJudiciary:
structure = {
district_courts: {
count: 94,
judges: ~670,
role: "Trial courts, find facts"
},
circuit_courts: {
count: 13,
judges: ~180,
role: "Appeals, set circuit precedent"
},
supreme_court: {
count: 1,
judges: 9,
role: "Final appellate, constitutional questions"
}
}
FUNCTION case_path(lawsuit):
// Most cases end at district court
// ~55,000 district court appeals per year
circuit_decision = appeals_court.hear(appeal)
// Most cases end here - SCOTUS denies ~99% of petitions
IF supreme_court.grants_cert(petition): // ~70 per year
RETURN supreme_court.decide()
ELSE:
RETURN circuit_decision // This IS final law
// Strategic implication:
// "Forum shopping" - file in favorable circuit
// Circuit splits create different law in different regions
TRUMP_JUDICIARY_EFFECT:
judges_appointed = 234 // in 4 years
circuit_judges = 54 // flipped multiple circuits
percentage_of_judiciary = ~27%
// Many will serve 30+ yearsJudiciary Act
Creates initial 6-justice Supreme Court and 13 district courts
Circuit Court of Appeals Act
Establishes modern three-tier structure; Supreme Court set at 9 justices
Garland Blocked
Senate refuses hearings for 293 days; seat filled by Trump nominee
Court Transformation
234 federal judges confirmed, including 3 Supreme Court justices
Court Reform Debates
Proposals to fix the judiciary - and why they face massive obstacles
Growing concerns about judicial legitimacy have sparked reform proposals ranging from term limits to court expansion. Each faces significant constitutional and political barriers.
CLASS CourtReformProposals:
OPTION term_limits:
proposal = "18-year terms, staggered (2 per presidential term)"
benefits = [
"Predictable vacancies",
"Reduced stakes per appointment",
"End strategic retirement"
]
obstacles = {
constitutional: "May require amendment
('during good Behaviour')",
workaround: "Rotate to lower courts after 18 years",
political: "Party in power always opposes"
}
OPTION court_expansion:
proposal = "Add justices (9 → 13, 15, etc.)"
benefits = [
"Clearly constitutional (Congress sets size)",
"Could rebalance partisan tilt",
"Historical precedent (changed 7 times)"
]
obstacles = {
legitimacy: "Seen as 'court packing'",
escalation: "Other party would expand too",
filibuster: "Requires 60 votes or rule change"
}
OPTION jurisdiction_stripping:
proposal = "Remove SCOTUS jurisdiction over certain issues"
benefits = [
"Congress has power under Article III",
"Simple majority (maybe)"
]
obstacles = {
constitutional: "Unclear if full stripping allowed",
court_review: "SCOTUS would review the stripping itself",
precedent: "Rarely used successfully"
}
OPTION ethics_code:
proposal = "Binding code of conduct for justices"
status = "2023: First code adopted (but self-enforced)"
problem = "No enforcement mechanism"The Reform Paradox
Most court reforms would need to survive review by the very court being reformed. The Court could strike down term limits, jurisdiction stripping, or even aspects of expansion. The institution that most needs reform is also the institution that gets to decide if reforms are constitutional.